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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • Prompt Injection (MEDIUM): In scripts/gatherers/linear-gatherer.ts, the team argument is interpolated directly into a natural language prompt for a headless Claude session without validation, enabling direct prompt injection into the sub-agent's instructions.\n- Data Exfiltration (MEDIUM): The scripts/gatherers/linear-gatherer.ts script reads ~/.claude/settings.json and ~/.claude/settings.local.json. These files contain sensitive agent configurations and potential API keys for MCP servers.\n- Command Execution (LOW): The skill relies on Bun.spawn to execute multiple local command-line tools. While functional, this represents a significant privilege surface area.\n- Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill gathers untrusted data (PR and Issue titles) and presents it to the agent without sanitization or boundary markers.\n
  • Ingestion points: github-gatherer.ts (PR titles), linear-gatherer.ts (Issue titles), beads-gatherer.ts (Issue titles).\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent; uses standard Markdown formatting.\n
  • Capability inventory: Shell access to VCS and issue tracking tools across all gatherer scripts.\n
  • Sanitization: None; text is interpolated directly into the final report.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:45 PM