scenarios
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill provides bash snippets intended for the agent to execute to ensure the
.scratch/directory is gitignored. - Evidence: The
<gitignore_check>section containsgrep -q '.scratch/' .gitignore || echo '.scratch/' >> .gitignoreand[ -f .gitignore ] || touch .gitignore. - DYNAMIC_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The primary workflow involves generating and running scripts at runtime.
- Evidence: The
<stages>and<workflow>sections describe a loop of writing scripts to a local directory and executing them to observe system behavior. - DATA_EXPOSURE (LOW): The workflow relies on the correct configuration of
.gitignoreto prevent test scripts containing credentials or sensitive tokens from being committed to version control. - Evidence: The
<scratch_directory>section explicitly mentions using real database connections and API keys in scripts located in the.scratch/folder. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill processes structured data from
scenarios.jsonlwhich could influence agent behavior if the file is modified by an untrusted party. - Ingestion points:
scenarios.jsonl(File access). - Boundary markers: Absent; no specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the JSONL fields are defined.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write and execute files in the
.scratch/directory and perform network operations viaapiimports. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify validation or sanitization of the
stepsorsetupfields in the JSONL file.
Audit Metadata