mcp-chaining
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The skill is designed to run research and implementation pipelines using the
Bashtool. While intrinsic to its functionality, this capability allows for general command execution on the host system. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (LOW): The documentation explicitly describes a pattern for passing the host's full
os.environto subprocesses to ensure API keys (e.g., from~/.claude/.env) are available to MCP tools. This broad exposure of sensitive environment variables to third-party tools is a potential security risk if a tool is compromised. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): As an indirect injection surface (Category 8), the skill ingests untrusted data from external sources via tools like
nia__search(documentation) andast-grep__find_code(source code). This data is used to inform downstream implementation steps, creating a path for malicious instructions embedded in documentation or codebases to influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points:
nia__search,ast-grep__find_code,morph__warpgrep_codebase_search. - Boundary markers: None specified in the provided snippets.
- Capability inventory:
Bashexecution, file reading (Read). - Sanitization: None mentioned for the interpolated tool outputs.
Audit Metadata