personize-memory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from various external sources, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in stored memories.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from CRMs (HubSpot, Salesforce), databases (Postgres, MySQL), and rich text sources (transcripts, emails) via the
memory.memorize()andmemory.memorizeBatch()methods, as described inSKILL.mdandreference/memorize.md. - Boundary markers: The provided context assembly recipes (e.g.,
recipes/context-assembly.ts) do not demonstrate the use of delimiters or instructions to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious content within the retrieved memories when building agent prompts. - Capability inventory: The skill facilitates wide-ranging data retrieval through methods like
smartRecallandsmartDigest, which are intended to provide context for agent generation pipelines. - Sanitization: While the SQL templates in
templates/postgres.mdinclude warnings against SQL injection, there is no explicit sanitization demonstrated for natural language instructions that might be contained within the ingested content. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes several well-known Node.js libraries to facilitate integrations with third-party services.
- Evidence: Integration templates and recipes reference packages such as
@hubspot/api-client,jsforce,pg, andmysql2for connecting to external CRM and database systems. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes standard build and deployment configurations for Node.js environments.
- Evidence: The
Dockerfileandgithub-action.ymlconfiguration files include standard commands such asnpm ciandnpm run buildto prepare the execution environment and compile the source code.
Audit Metadata