drawnote-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill utilizes
child_process.spawnandexecSyncacross multiple scripts (install-dependencies.js,verify-installation.js) to executenpmandnpxcommands. - Evidence:
spawn('npx', ['playwright', 'install', ...])inscripts/install-dependencies.jsandspawn('npm', ['install'])inscripts/verify-installation.js. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The installation process automatically triggers the download of the Chromium browser and system-level dependencies. While Playwright is a reputable source, automated binary execution in a skill environment is a high-risk pattern.
- Evidence:
npx playwright install chromium --with-depsis executed in thepostinstallhook andscripts/install-dependencies.js. - [DATA_EXPOSURE] (LOW): The
scripts/capture.jsscript allows the agent to open and screenshot any local file accessible to the process using thefile://protocol. This could be abused via indirect prompt injection to leak sensitive local files (e.g., config files or ssh keys) as images. - Evidence:
const fileUrl = \file://${absoluteHtmlPath}`;followed byawait page.goto(fileUrl)inscripts/capture.js`. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill ingests untrusted HTML data which is then rendered in a browser environment with sandbox-disabling flags (
--no-sandbox). - Ingestion point:
html-file-pathargument inscripts/capture.js. - Boundary markers: None identified.
- Capability inventory: Local file read, screenshot generation, and shell command execution (via other scripts in the package).
- Sanitization: None; the script resolves absolute paths without validating if the target file is intended to be processed.
Audit Metadata