skills/phuetz/code-buddy/blender/Gen Agent Trust Hub

blender

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation suggests an MCP server integration using the command npx -y @ahujasid/blender-mcp. This involves downloading and executing code from an unverified third-party developer on the NPM registry.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary Python code within the Blender process using flags such as --python and --python-expr, as well as a dedicated blender_execute_script tool. This creates a significant surface for executing dynamically generated code.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the blender binary via shell commands for rendering, scene management, and batch processing.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its ingestion of external script data and 3D model files.
  • Ingestion points: Scripts processed by the blender_execute_script tool and model files loaded via blender_import_model.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the provided templates.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the bpy API and system modules like os and glob for file operations.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or script sanitization before execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 5, 2026, 01:08 AM