pckle
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The troubleshooting instructions describe installing the CLI tool using
curl -fsSL https://<PCKLE_HOST>/install.sh | sh. This pattern executes a remote script directly in the shell, which can be used to execute arbitrary code. However, this is presented as a vendor-provided installation method for the tool maintained by the skill author. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by passing natural language instructions from potentially untrusted sources directly to an autonomous AI task execution engine.
- Ingestion points: The
--instructionand--inputflags in thepckle task createcommand, including support for reading from files via the@prompt.txtsyntax. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit boundary markers are provided to isolate user-supplied instructions from the task execution logic.
- Capability inventory: The tool can perform autonomous AI searches, list and manage tasks, and has access to local CLI configuration files and environment variables. The agent also has
Bashaccess. - Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization of the natural language instruction is mentioned in the documentation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires
Bash(pckle:*)permissions and demonstrates complex command chains usingjqandxargsto manipulate task IDs and automate CLI operations, which involves executing multiple shell commands based on tool output.
Audit Metadata