meegle-mcp

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (HIGH): The skill transmits sensitive MEEGLE_USER_KEY and MEEGLE_MCP_KEY as query parameters in the URL within scripts/mcp-proxy.js. Credentials sent via query strings are often leaked in server logs and proxy records.
  • [Persistence Mechanisms] (HIGH): The scripts/setup.sh script modifies user shell profiles (~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, ~/.bash_profile) to store API keys as environment variables. While intended for convenience, this persists sensitive data in plaintext across sessions.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill has a high-severity vulnerability surface.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via API responses from project.larksuite.com processed in scripts/mcp-proxy.js.
  • Boundary markers: None identified. External content is not delimited from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can create projects, update tasks, move workflow stages, and manage team members (as described in SKILL.md and README.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external API content is performed before returning it to the agent.
  • [Privilege Escalation] (MEDIUM): The scripts/setup.sh script automatically applies chmod +x to internal scripts. While common for setup, this modification of file permissions is a privilege-related action.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 07:56 AM