headless-adapters

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill documentation instructs users to execute @plaited/agent-eval-harness via bunx. This involves downloading and running code from a source that is not included in the Trusted External Sources list.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The provided schemas (claude-headless.json and gemini-headless.json) include command-line arguments designed to bypass internal security checks of the wrapped agents, specifically --dangerously-skip-permissions for Claude and --sandbox false for Gemini.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (SAFE): No evidence of malicious prompt injection or system prompt extraction patterns was found in the skill metadata or instructions.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (SAFE): No hardcoded credentials or patterns suggesting unauthorized data exfiltration were detected.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill processes output from external CLI tools using JSONPath. This creates an attack surface where a compromised or malicious CLI tool could output data that influences the downstream agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: outputEvents in claude-headless.json and gemini-headless.json which process lines from the CLI's stdout.
  • Boundary markers: Absent in the schema configurations.
  • Capability inventory: Spawning sub-processes with the command defined in the command field.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of extracted JSONPath content is performed before emission.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 19, 2026, 11:20 PM