skills/plurigrid/asi/borkdude/Gen Agent Trust Hub

borkdude

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill includes a propagation script (propagate-skill!) that reads files from a source directory and writes them to various agent skill directories (e.g., .claude/skills/). This capability allows for potential lateral movement of malicious skill definitions across different agent environments.
  • Ingestion points: slurp in SKILL.md reads content from .ruler/skills/[skill-name]/SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The content is copied directly without delimiters or instruction-ignore warnings.
  • Capability inventory: File writing (spit), directory creation (fs/create-dirs), and execution of multiple runtimes (bb, npx, sci).
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no validation or filtering of the content being propagated.
  • [Remote Code Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill utilizes npx to download and execute code from the npm registry for tools like nbb, squint, and cherry. It also employs the Babashka pod system (pods/load-pod) to download and load external binary extensions, which are not from trusted sources.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill implements the Small Clojure Interpreter (SCI) via sci/eval-string*, enabling dynamic execution of code strings at runtime. This creates an attack surface for code injection if evaluated strings incorporate external data.
  • [External Downloads] (LOW): The skill references an external JavaScript dependency (scittle) hosted on the jsDelivr CDN, which is used for browser-based execution.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:50 PM