topoi-hatchery
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill utilizes
just installto execute system commands where the execution path is determined by a 'coin-flip' logic. This non-deterministic behavior is a technique to bypass predictable auditing and security controls. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The skill pulls dependencies and code from the untrusted repository
TeglonLabs/topoi. This repository is outside the trusted scope, posing a supply-chain risk. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): This skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Processes 'evaluable forms' and 'dependency space' from external sources.
- Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' markers are present in the definitions.
- Capability inventory: Includes
just install(arbitrary command runner),babashka(scripting engine), andqemu(system emulation). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of external content before evaluation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill attempts to install system-level software including
qemuandgithubmanagement tools. These operations typically require elevated privileges and provide a broad attack surface for system persistence or unauthorized repository access.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata