inbox-exploration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes report summaries, findings, and work logs that are generated by signal clustering and agentic scouts (e.g.,
signals_scout). This creates an attack surface where instructions embedded in external data could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
inbox-reports-retrieveandinbox-report-artefacts-listtools, which return summaries and curated evidence (documented inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill provides explicit boundary instructions, stating that a report is a "diagnosis, not ground truth" and warns the agent to "Never implement a report's fix straight from its summary."
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to modify report states (
inbox-reports-set-state), claim ownership (inbox-reports-claim), and update source configurations (inbox-source-configs-partial-update). It also encourages file system interaction and Pull Request creation. - Sanitization: No programmatic sanitization of the input text is described, but the requirement for manual verification against the codebase acts as a critical security control.
Audit Metadata