suggesting-data-imports
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface as it ingests metadata from external systems.
- Ingestion points: In
SKILL.md, the workflow utilizesposthog:external-data-schemas-listandposthog:execute-sqlto read schema metadata, table names, and column descriptions from external databases (e.g., Postgres, MySQL) and SaaS platforms (e.g., Stripe, HubSpot). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or specific "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the metadata returned by external tools.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
posthog:execute-sqlfor data querying andposthog:data-warehouse-source-setupfor managing data warehouse connections. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization or validation steps for the metadata retrieved from external sources before the agent processes it.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill proactively addresses credential safety by instructing the agent to use
posthog:data-warehouse-source-connect-linkto collect credentials securely in the browser. This prevents users from being prompted to share sensitive passwords or OAuth tokens directly within the chat interface, which is a recognized security best practice.
Audit Metadata