git-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it incorporates data from untrusted external sources (git history, branch names, and the bd issue tracker) into the agent's context without sanitization.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill reads git metadata via
git pull/fetchand issue details using thebdCLI tool as described in SKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions provided to the agent to delimit or ignore instructions that may be embedded in commit messages or issue descriptions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the use of
Bash,Write, andEdittools, granting the agent the ability to execute code and modify the file system based on potentially malicious input.\n - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any validation or filtering for content retrieved from external sources.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
Bashtool to execute git operations and a proprietary issue-management CLI tool namedbd.\n - Evidence: Multiple references to
bd update,bd create, andbd closefor managing tasks, as well as complexgit commitcommands.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to synchronize code with remote repositories.\n - Evidence: Frequent use of
git fetch origin,git pull origin main, andgit pushto manage remote state.
Audit Metadata