skills/proyecto26/projectx/turborepo/Gen Agent Trust Hub

turborepo

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses a high-risk capability profile by combining file ingestion tools (Read, Grep, Glob) with modification tools (Edit, Write) and execution tools (Bash(pnpm:*), Bash(turbo:*)).
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads untrusted data from the monorepo codebase (e.g., package.json, turbo.json, and source code).
  • Boundary markers: There are no defined boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can modify any file and execute pnpm scripts. Since pnpm can execute any script defined in a package.json, an attacker who can influence a file read by the agent (via a PR, issue, or malicious file in the repo) could lead the agent to modify a script and run it.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the monorepo content is performed before interpolation or execution.
  • Command Execution (MEDIUM): Although the Bash tool is restricted to pnpm:* and turbo:*, these tools are inherently capable of executing arbitrary shell commands defined in scripts sections of configuration files. This restriction provides a false sense of security if the agent can be coerced into modifying those scripts.
  • Data Exposure (LOW): The documentation explicitly encourages the inclusion of sensitive keys such as STRIPE_SECRET_KEY and DATABASE_URL in turbo.json configurations. While standard for Turborepo, this makes these secrets prominent targets for the agent's file-reading capabilities.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 06:10 AM