claude-to-im
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's primary logic depends on the
claude-to-impackage, which is fetched directly from an unverified GitHub repository (op7418/claude-to-im) during installation instead of a standard package registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages a background Node.js daemon using various shell and PowerShell scripts (
daemon.sh,supervisor-macos.sh,supervisor-windows.ps1). This daemon executes theclaudeorcodexCLI tools to provide terminal-level capabilities to the remote AI agent. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill collects messaging platform API tokens via an interactive setup wizard. It follows security best practices by storing these in a restricted file (
~/.claude-to-im/config.envwith600permissions) and redacting them from all log outputs and setup summaries using regex masking patterns. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
doctor.shdiagnostic tool makes outbound network requests to official messaging platform APIs (Telegram, Feishu, QQ) to validate token functionality. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a vulnerability surface where untrusted input from messaging platforms is processed by an agent with shell access.
- Ingestion points: Messaging platform APIs (Telegram, Discord, etc.) integrated in
src/main.ts. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary delimiters or 'ignore embedded instruction' warnings are added to user messages before they are processed by the agent.
- Capability inventory: Full terminal access via
Bash,Write, andEdittools as inherited from the underlying AI CLI. - Sanitization: No input sanitization or filtering is performed on message content.
- Mitigation: The skill implements interactive permission gates (inline approval buttons) and user allow-lists to restrict tool usage to authorized users.
Audit Metadata