book-tools
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The script
scripts/setup.shdownloads a pre-compiled binary from a GitHub repository (iosifache/annas-mcp) that is not on the trusted organizations or repositories list. - Evidence:
setup.shdefinesurl="https://github.com/iosifache/annas-mcp/releases/download/${ANNAS_VERSION}/${filename}"and usescurl -fsSL "$url"to retrieve it. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill installs and grants execution permissions to the downloaded binary without performing any integrity checks such as SHA-256 checksum verification.
- Evidence:
setup.shexecuteschmod +x "$INSTALL_DIR/annas-mcp"on the downloaded file and theSKILL.mdinstructions encourage the agent to run this setup. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill relies heavily on shell command execution for its primary functions, including dependency management and tool configuration.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains multiple blocks forbashandpython3execution, andsetup.shusespip installandtaroperations. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it fetches and displays book metadata (titles, descriptions) from external, attacker-influenced databases (Z-Library and Anna's Archive).
- Ingestion points: Data returned by
python3 ${SKILL_PATH}/scripts/book.py search. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions in
SKILL.mdtell the agent to present results in a table without warning it to ignore instructions embedded in the metadata. - Capability inventory: The skill has filesystem write access (
downloadcommand) and shell execution capabilities. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the search results is mentioned before presenting them to the user or the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata