mcp-builder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The file
scripts/connections.pyimplements a wrapper for the MCPstdiotransport which enables the execution of arbitrary system commands through subprocesses. Although this is a core requirement for local MCP server integration, it provides the agent with high-privilege access to the underlying system. Evidence:stdio_client(StdioServerParameters(command=self.command, args=self.args, env=self.env))inscripts/connections.py. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The
SKILL.mdfile directs the agent to fetch documentation and resource files frommodelcontextprotocol.ioand GitHub repositories under themodelcontextprotocolorganization. These sources are not included in the pre-approved list of trusted external sources, although they are the official providers for this protocol. Evidence:WebFetchinstructions in Phase 1.2 and 1.3 ofSKILL.md. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (LOW): The implementation guide in
SKILL.mdrecommends usingnpx @modelcontextprotocol/inspectorfor testing. Usingnpxinvolves downloading and executing packages from the npm registry at runtime, which is a form of remote code execution. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process documentation from external, non-trusted websites and then perform actions (like command execution) based on that content. Mandatory Evidence Chain: 1. Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdinstructions to fetch external URLs. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. 3. Capability inventory: Command execution viascripts/connections.py. 4. Sanitization: Absent.
Audit Metadata