horse-race
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a shell here-doc (
cat > /tmp/horse-race-winner.patch << 'PATCH_EOF') to save agent-generated code. Because the delimiterPATCH_EOFis static and predictable, a malicious agent could purposefully include this string in its output to break out of the command and execute arbitrary bash instructions on the host system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Automated maintenance and cleanup are performed using shell pipelines (
git worktree list,grep,sed,while read) to remove project directories. This involves piping system information into a loop for execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture relies on agents consuming and improving upon code generated by other agents, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions can be passed between agents.
- Ingestion points: The
agent_j_diffcontent is processed by agents in both Phase 2 (Improvement Rounds) and Phase 3 (Voting) inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt instructions use Markdown code blocks (
```diff) to delimit agent content. - Capability inventory: The orchestrating agent has permissions for file system writes, shell execution, and git repository management.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on agent-generated diffs before they are processed by other agents or written to the filesystem using shell commands.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches and installs the skill package from the author's repository using the
npx skills installcommand as described in the README.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata