qodo-pr-resolver
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads sensitive credentials from
~/.qodo/config.json, includingGERRIT_HTTP_PASSWORD,BB_APP_PASSWORD, andAZURE_DEVOPS_EXT_PAT. This is used for authenticating with git provider APIs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system commands including
git(for branch management and commits),curl(for API interactions), and provider CLIs likegh,glab, andaz. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download a
commit-msghook from a user-configured Gerrit server URL and set it as executable. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its core functionality of following "agent prompts" from PR comments.
- Ingestion points: Fetches untrusted comment data via provider APIs (e.g.,
gh api,glab mr view, Bitbucket/Gerrit REST endpoints). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or isolation instructions are provided to distinguish between the intended Qodo agent prompt and potentially malicious injected content in comments.
- Capability inventory: The agent has full access to modify files using the
Edittool, commit changes to the repository, and perform network operations. - Sanitization: The skill lacks validation or sanitization mechanisms to ensure the instructions in the comment body are legitimate and safe before they are followed.
Audit Metadata