newapi
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/exec-token.jsuseschild_process.execSyncwith theshell: trueoption to execute commands. These commands are dynamically constructed by the AI using a template where a placeholder is replaced by a fetched API key. This pattern allows for arbitrary command execution on the host system.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scriptscripts/copy-key.jsexecutes system commands (pbcopy,xclip,xsel) viaexecSyncto manage clipboard operations and pipes sensitive keys directly into them.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Thescripts/env.jsscript reads.envfiles from the project root and skill directory to load sensitive configuration such asNEWAPI_ACCESS_TOKENandNEWAPI_USER_ID.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation indocs/help.mdinstructs the AI to perform network requests tohttps://apifox.newapi.ai/llms.txtandhttps://www.newapi.ai/llms.txtto retrieve usage guidelines, which are then used to influence the assistant's behavior.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface. - Ingestion points:
docs/help.mddirects the AI to fetch content from external URLs (apifox.newapi.ai,newapi.ai). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when processing this external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including arbitrary shell command execution (
scripts/exec-token.js) and file modification (scripts/inject-key.js). - Sanitization: Although the skill uses
scripts/sanitize.jsfor best-effort redaction, this is a heuristic approach that may not prevent the AI from following malicious instructions embedded in external documentation.
Audit Metadata