skills/qwibitai/nanoclaw/debug/Gen Agent Trust Hub

debug

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation provides instructions to access sensitive files containing authentication tokens.
  • Evidence: Explains using cat .env to verify CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN and ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in SKILL.md.
  • Evidence: Accesses ~/.claude/projects/ which contains session history and potentially sensitive metadata.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous examples of powerful shell commands that an agent is encouraged to use for troubleshooting.
  • Evidence: Usage of docker run with arbitrary shell commands via the -c flag to inspect environment variables and file systems in SKILL.md.
  • Evidence: Instructions to use rm -rf data/sessions/ to clear session data.
  • Evidence: Usage of sqlite3 to directly modify the application's database.
  • Evidence: Mentions sudo systemctl start docker in a diagnostic script snippet.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the reading of sensitive configuration and session data from the host system.
  • Evidence: Commands like cat /workspace/env-dir/env inside a container mount host secrets for verification.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The documented architecture reveals a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md documents an entry point where a JSON payload containing a prompt field is piped into a Docker container.
  • Boundary markers: Absent.
  • Capability inventory: SKILL.md explicitly lists Bash, Read, and Write as allowed tools for the agent.
  • Sanitization: Absent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 26, 2026, 09:50 PM