electrobun-distribution

[Skill Scanner] URL pointing to executable file detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: URL pointing to executable file detected (CI010) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: URL pointing to executable file detected (CI010) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: URL pointing to executable file detected (CI010) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] This skill documentation is consistent with its stated purpose (packaging, signing, notarization, distribution, and auto-update). There is no direct malicious code present in the provided content. However multiple high-impact operational risks are present and should be mitigated: (1) macOS entitlements shown are permissive and weaken platform protections — avoid enabling 'allow-unsigned-executable-memory' and 'disable-library-validation' unless strictly necessary and understood; (2) auto-update design requires trusting the update server — ensure updates are cryptographically signed, served over HTTPS, and that signature verification occurs client-side before installation; (3) CI handling of private signing certificates is sensitive — use short-lived credentials, restricted runners, and strong secret management; (4) fix insecure examples (use https timestamping endpoint). Overall the content is BENIGN in intent but operationally sensitive; follow best practices for signing keys, update server security, and restrictive entitlements. LLM verification: This package/document is a legitimate and standard distribution and auto-update guide for Electrobun applications. It does not contain obvious malicious code, but it describes high-risk operational practices if implemented without strong controls: updater trust model relies on the update server and sample code lacks explicit client-side signature verification; CI handling of signing keys exposes high-value credentials; macOS entitlements relax important protections. Treat this as operational sup