synthesis-meeting-transcripts
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
optional-workspace-mcp/install-autostart.shmodifies system configuration files to establish background persistence for the workspace-mcp server. - Evidence: Writing a LaunchAgent plist to
~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.rajivpant.workspace-mcp.pliston macOS. - Evidence: Creating and enabling a systemd user unit at
~/.config/systemd/user/workspace-mcp.serviceon Linux. - Evidence: The skill instructs the user to modify shell configuration files (.zshrc/.bashrc) to add persistent aliases.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
optional-workspace-mcp/start.shscript executes code downloaded from an external public registry at runtime. - Evidence: Uses
uvx workspace-mcpto download and run the third-partyworkspace-mcppackage from PyPI. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on and executes code from a remote source not listed among the trusted organizations.
- Evidence: Fetches the
workspace-mcppackage from the PyPI registry. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill and its associated scripts are designed to perform broad searches and extraction of sensitive meeting data across Google Drive and Gmail.
- Evidence:
fetch-meeting.pyuses MCP toolssearch_drive_filesandget_drive_file_contentto retrieve full meeting transcripts, including speaker attributions and Gemini-generated notes, which may contain sensitive business or personal information.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata