The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that explicitly bypass human oversight. The 'Rules' section in SKILL.md states: 'Proceed without confirmation — do not ask the user to approve the commit message or confirm before committing. Stage, generate the message, and commit in one flow.' This removes the critical safety step where a user reviews changes before they are recorded in the repository history.
[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection because it processes untrusted data from the local environment to drive its logic.
Ingestion points: The agent reads data from the filesystem using git status, git diff, git diff --cached, and git log --oneline -5 as defined in the 'Review' step of SKILL.md.
Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the data ingested from the git commands.
Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to modify the repository state and filesystem via git add -u, git commit, git merge --squash, and git worktree remove.
Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the file content retrieved during the diffing process before it is used to 'Analyse for multi-concern splitting' or 'Generate commit message'.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs several autonomous shell operations. While it uses git add -u (which is safer than git add . as it only stages tracked files), the combination of autonomous execution and lack of user confirmation for the git commit command could lead to the unintended staging and committing of code if an attacker manipulates the files being analyzed.

git-commit