shannon
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) where untrusted user input can influence the behavior of spawned sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: User input provided via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable inSKILL.mdis ingested and then used to populate prompts for multiple sub-agents. - Boundary markers: The skill fails to use clear boundary markers, such as XML tags or explicit delimiters, when embedding user-provided problem descriptions into the templates for the Simplifier, Analogist, Reframer, Decomposer, and Inverter sub-agents.
- Capability inventory: Spawned sub-agents have access to a broad toolset, including file system access (
Read,Write,Edit), shell access (Bash), and the ability to spawn further agents or message others, providing a large attack surface if an injection succeeds. - Sanitization: No input sanitization, filtering, or instruction-ignoring guardrails are implemented for the interpolated user content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute a transparent diagnostic command (echo "${CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS:-not_set}") to check environment variables before determining the team-spawning logic. This is a legitimate use of the tool for environment detection.
Audit Metadata