living-docs
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): This skill is primarily designed to ingest and interpret untrusted external data (git diffs), creating a significant attack surface.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/extract-diff.shscript retrieves raw git diffs, file lists, and commit logs, which are then passed to the agent's context. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions in
references/analysis-patterns.mddo not define delimiters or structural boundaries to help the agent distinguish between legitimate code changes and adversarial instructions embedded in comments or code. - Capability inventory: While the skill itself is read-only, it is intended to guide the generation of high-trust documents like
Architecture Decision Records (ADRs)andRunbooks (SOPs). An injection in a diff could trick the agent into documenting malicious procedures or making unauthorized architectural changes if the agent possesses file-writing capabilities. - Sanitization: Absent. No filtering or escaping is performed on the diff output before it is analyzed by the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The
scripts/extract-diff.shscript executes severalgitcommands using variables derived from user-controllable arguments. - Evidence: Variables like
$REPO_PATH,$TARGET_BRANCH, and$PATH_FILTERare used in subshells and command arguments (e.g.,git diff "$RANGE" "${PATH_ARGS[@]}"). While the script uses double-quoting, it relies on the calling agent to ensure these strings do not contain malicious flags or path traversals that could compromise the local environment.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata