living-docs

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 13, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): This skill is primarily designed to ingest and interpret untrusted external data (git diffs), creating a significant attack surface.
  • Ingestion points: The scripts/extract-diff.sh script retrieves raw git diffs, file lists, and commit logs, which are then passed to the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions in references/analysis-patterns.md do not define delimiters or structural boundaries to help the agent distinguish between legitimate code changes and adversarial instructions embedded in comments or code.
  • Capability inventory: While the skill itself is read-only, it is intended to guide the generation of high-trust documents like Architecture Decision Records (ADRs) and Runbooks (SOPs). An injection in a diff could trick the agent into documenting malicious procedures or making unauthorized architectural changes if the agent possesses file-writing capabilities.
  • Sanitization: Absent. No filtering or escaping is performed on the diff output before it is analyzed by the LLM.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The scripts/extract-diff.sh script executes several git commands using variables derived from user-controllable arguments.
  • Evidence: Variables like $REPO_PATH, $TARGET_BRANCH, and $PATH_FILTER are used in subshells and command arguments (e.g., git diff "$RANGE" "${PATH_ARGS[@]}"). While the script uses double-quoting, it relies on the calling agent to ensure these strings do not contain malicious flags or path traversals that could compromise the local environment.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 13, 2026, 08:47 PM