moai-domain-adb
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The
scripts/utils/adb_shell.pyscript allows for the execution of arbitrary shell commands on a connected Android device. While this is a fundamental feature for ADB automation, it represents a high-risk capability that could be misused to perform destructive actions on the mobile device (e.g.,rm -rf,pm uninstall) if the agent processes untrusted instructions. - Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution (LOW): Multiple scripts (including
adb_screenshot.py,adb_device_info.py, andadb_running_app.py) define extensive dependency lists in their PEP 723 headers. These includeopencv-python,pytesseract,adbutils, and others. These packages are fetched from PyPI at runtime. Although these are common libraries, the large attack surface and use of unpinned versions (e.g.,>=) introduce potential supply-chain risks. - Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The
scripts/common/path_utils.pymodule usessys.path.insert(0, adbautoplayer_path_str)to modify the Python search path at runtime based on a dynamically detected project root. This pattern of computing and injecting paths into the execution environment can be exploited if an attacker can influence the project directory structure. - Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW):
- Ingestion points:
adb_app_list.py(parses package names),adb_running_app.py(parses active window/activity names). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat data retrieved from the device as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The skill has full device control via
adb shellincluding UI automation, file manipulation, and system settings access. - Sanitization: None. Data retrieved from the device (like a maliciously named app package) is passed directly to the agent's context, which could lead to subversion of the agent's logic.
Audit Metadata