moai-library-toon
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill's primary specification (TOON v4.0) explicitly supports and encourages arbitrary shell command execution via a dedicated
execfield in its YAML-based definitions. - Evidence in
SKILL.md: The 'Menu Command Types' table listsexecfor 'Run shell command'. - Evidence in
SKILL.md: Example implementation shows- trigger: run-tests, exec: "pytest tests/ -v --cov"and- trigger: another-command, exec: "shell command to execute". - Risk: An agent interpreting these TOON definitions is instructed to execute arbitrary strings as system commands, leading to total system compromise if the source file is malicious.
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill promotes the installation of third-party packages from NPM and PyPI that are not part of the trusted source list.
- Evidence in
README.md: Instructions to runnpm install @toon-format/toon,pip install toon-format, andnpm install -g @toon-format/cli. - Evidence in
modules/core.md: Instructions to runuv pip install toon_format tiktoken. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The combination of the
execcapability and theworkflowtrigger (which loads and potentially executes remote YAML files) facilitates multi-stage RCE. - Evidence in
SKILL.md: Theworkflowtrigger allows loading definitions from paths like{project-root}/.claude/workflows/.../workflow.yaml. If these paths are controlled by an attacker (e.g., via a PR or untrusted data), the agent will execute the commands defined within them. - INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION (LOW): The skill is designed to ingest and process external data for encoding/decoding, creating a surface for injection attacks.
- Ingestion points:
modules/advanced-patterns.md(validate,toon_to_json,compress_documents) andmodules/core.md(decode). - Boundary markers: Absent. There is no evidence of delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore content within the TOON data.
- Capability inventory: Arbitrary shell execution (
exec), file reading (data), and workflow loading (workflow) as defined inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: Absent. The provided Python conversion logic does not sanitize input strings before processing or potentially passing them to an execution engine.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata