spark-recipe-meeting-prep
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through
spark search(email bodies) andspark meeting(transcripts and notes) as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the retrieved emails or transcripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
sparkcommand-line tools to read emails, contacts, and calendar data. No file-writing, arbitrary shell execution, or external network operations (outside of the core tool's function) were detected. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation performed on the email bodies or meeting transcripts before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata