artist-workspace
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-supplied input ($ARTIST_NAME) into shell command substitutions and unquoted heredocs. \n
- Evidence:
ARTIST_SLUG=$(echo "$ARTIST_NAME" | tr ...)andcat > "$ARTIST_DIR/RECOUP.md" <<EOFinSKILL.md.\n - Risk: This enables arbitrary code execution if a user provides an artist name containing shell meta-characters like
$(...).\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches a multi-step workflow playbook from an external developer portal. \n - Evidence:
https://developers.recoupable.com/workflows/create-artistinSKILL.md.\n - Note: This is a vendor-owned resource used to provide operational guidance for artist onboarding.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by reading and acting upon data from potentially untrusted workspace files. \n
- Ingestion points:
RECOUP.mdandcontext/artist.mdare read to determine identity and creative constraints.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat this content as untrusted data.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell commands and network operations via API calls while processing this data.\n
- Sanitization: Basic formatting is applied to slugs, but the body of the data being read is not sanitized or validated.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata