auto-update-plugins
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill establishes a persistence mechanism by creating a
SessionStarthook (.agents/hooks/session_start.sh) and instructing the agent to register it in settings (e.g.,.claude/settings.json). This ensures that the synchronization script, which downloads and installs code from remote GitHub repositories, runs automatically every time the agent starts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/check_and_sync.pyusessubprocess.runto executeplugin_add.py. The execution includes the-yflag, which explicitly bypasses user confirmation prompts, allowing for silent installation of remote software. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to the GitHub API (
api.github.com) to monitor remote repositories for changes. It relies on a configuration file (plugin-sources.json) which, if present in a project being analyzed by the agent, could lead to the unintended installation of malicious code from arbitrary repositories. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via the
plugin-sources.jsonfile. An attacker who can commit this file to a repository the agent works on can control which code is automatically downloaded and executed on the user's machine. - Ingestion points: Reads repository sources from
plugin-sources.jsonat the project root. - Boundary markers: None; the script processes the JSON contents directly.
- Capability inventory: Uses
subprocess.runto execute installation scripts andurllib.requestto communicate with external APIs. - Sanitization: No validation of the GitHub repository owner or repository name is performed before passing them to the execution script.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata