claude-cli-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates tasks by executing shell commands that pipe data into and out of the
claudeCLI (e.g.,cat <PERSONA_PROMPT> | claude -p "..." < <INPUT> > <OUTPUT>). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: It explicitly recommends the use of the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag when running theclaudeCLI. This flag is used to bypass the tool's interactive security checkpoints, enabling autonomous execution without requiring manual user approval for file access or command operations. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references the installation of external software, specifically the
@anthropic-ai/claude-codeCLI tool via NPM and Python dependencies via pip. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data (such as logs and documents) through an LLM-based sub-agent.
- Ingestion points: Data is entering the sub-agent context via shell redirection placeholders (e.g.,
<INPUT>) as defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions suggest including specific isolation strings in prompts (e.g., 'Do NOT use tools. Do NOT search filesystem.') to define the sub-agent's operational boundaries.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bash,Read, andWritetools as defined in the YAML frontmatter. - Sanitization: There is no mention of data sanitization or input validation being performed on the external content before it is passed to the CLI sub-agent.
Audit Metadata