create-sub-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it accepts user-controlled names and descriptions that are directly interpolated into the system instructions of generated agents.
- Ingestion points: The
--nameand--descCLI arguments inscripts/scaffold.pyare populated from user input. - Boundary markers: Absent in the Jinja templates (e.g.,
templates/agent.md.jinja), which do not delimit user-provided data from system instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill performs filesystem write operations and generates executable scripts using the
Bashtool. - Sanitization: While resource names are validated against a regular expression (
r'^[a-z0-9-]+$'), the description field is used without sanitization, allowing potential instruction injection into the generated configurations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/scaffold.pyscript generates Python scripts from templates and programmatically grants them executable permissions usingos.chmodwith mode0o755. This creation and permission modification of executable files at runtime is a core feature but constitutes dynamic code generation.
Audit Metadata