exploration-workflow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it orchestrates a workflow that heavily relies on ingesting and processing external requirements data.
- Ingestion points: The workflow reads from
exploration/session-brief.mdand various files inexploration/captures/(such asproblem-framing.md,brd-draft.md, anduser-stories-draft.md) to build context for subsequent agent calls. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested markdown files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Read, andWritetools, and it executes several internal Python scripts (dispatch.py,check_gaps.py,execute.py,generate_workflow.py) to perform its tasks. - Sanitization: There is no indication that the content of the captures or the session brief is sanitized or validated before being interpolated into the context of sub-agent dispatches.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's 'Re-Entry' section contains a documentation pattern that suggests an unsafe use of the shell:
echo "CONTEXT: [describe the blocking ambiguity or engineering question here]" > /tmp/reentry-context-$$.md. If the agent follows this instruction literally and populates the placeholder with un-sanitized text from a user (e.g., containing backticks, semicolons, or$(...)syntax), it could lead to arbitrary command execution within the shell environment.
Audit Metadata