orchestrator

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's instructions explicitly recommend using the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag when invoking sub-agents. This practice bypasses built-in security prompts, allowing the agent to perform actions without explicit user confirmation.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill configuration and instructions rely on the execution of Python scripts (agent_orchestrator.py and swarm_run.py) that reside outside the skill's root directory via relative paths (../../../scripts/). This creates a dependency on external code that is not contained within the skill's own distribution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it accepts untrusted user triggers to determine complex routing logic and generate downstream task packets.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted user input enters the workflow through the primary 'trigger' assessment described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions to treat user triggers as untrusted data when generating planning artifacts.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestrator has powerful capabilities including Bash execution, Read/Write file access, and the ability to spawn and control sub-agents.
  • Sanitization: The instructions lack any requirement for input validation or escaping before user-provided content is incorporated into task packets.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 3, 2026, 04:39 PM