pr-comment-responder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation in
SKILL.mdandreferences/workflow.mddescribes a workflow that involves interpolating the raw user prompt into shell commands, such aspython3 "$SCRIPTS_DIR/utils/extract_github_context.py" --text "[prompt]". This pattern is risky as it could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands if the agent platform performs literal string substitution without sufficient escaping of shell-sensitive characters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, creating an indirect prompt injection surface. 1. Ingestion points: The skill retrieves PR review comments and issue comments via
get_pr_review_comments.pyas indicated inSKILL.mdandreferences/workflow.md. 2. Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters mentioned to isolate the retrieved comment content or to instruct the agent to ignore embedded commands before passing them to the orchestrator agent in Phase 3. 3. Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to perform repository actions, including posting replies viapost_pr_comment_reply.py, resolving threads viaresolve_pr_review_thread.py, and merging PRs as referenced inreferences/bots.md. 4. Sanitization: The workflow lacks documentation or implementation of input sanitization or validation for the comment text before it is analyzed and acted upon by the agent.
Audit Metadata