candid-ship
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill reads shell commands for build and test phases directly from project-level configuration files (
.candid/config.json) and executes them in the shell. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an indirect prompt injection surface by interpolating the
additionalPromptfield from a project configuration file into the instructions provided to the/candid-loopsub-agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands for the GitHub CLI (
gh) using git log metadata, such as commit titles and bodies, without sanitization. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: (Category 8 Evidence) Ingestion points: The
.candid/config.jsonfile in the repository. Boundary markers: Uses an instructional prefix ('IMPORTANT: During this review...') rather than secure delimiters. Capability inventory: Shell command execution, Git push operations, and GitHub PR creation. Sanitization: None detected for the interpolated prompt content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: (Category 8 Evidence) Ingestion points: The
.candid/config.jsonfile in the repository. Boundary markers: None. Capability inventory: Execution of arbitrary shell commands. Sanitization: The skill implements a manual confirmation step where the user is shown the plan, including the commands to be run, before execution.
Audit Metadata