video-extend
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents an attack surface where source video URLs processed by the CLI are untrusted and could contain hidden instructions. It provides a clear evidence chain and mitigations:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted
video_urlenters the context via theruncomfy runcommand arguments in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation instructs the agent to ingest only user-provided URLs and provides guidelines for detecting divergence from prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
runcomfy run(SKILL.md) to perform network operations and local file writes to an output directory. - Sanitization: The skill explicitly states that the CLI does not shell-expand prompt content, mitigating shell injection.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
runcomfyCLI to execute video extension tasks. This usage is confined to the specific vendor tool declared in theallowed-toolsfrontmatter and is consistent with the skill's primary purpose. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references installing the
@runcomfy/clipackage via npm. This is a standard installation procedure for the vendor's own verified tools and is documented for operator setup. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill describes how the CLI manages API tokens, including the storage path at
~/.config/runcomfy/token.json. It provides best practices for managing these secrets, such as using environment variables and avoiding echoing them in logs.
Audit Metadata