agent-dev-backend-api

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's hooks (pre_execution, post_execution, and on_error) frequently execute npx claude-flow@alpha. This command downloads and runs a package from the NPM registry at runtime. This dependency is an 'alpha' version and does not originate from a well-known or trusted organization.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The shell scripts defined in the lifecycle hooks interpolate variables such as $TASK, $TASK_CONTEXT, and $TASK_OUTPUT directly into commands (e.g., npx claude-flow@alpha memory search-patterns "API implementation: $TASK"). If these variables contain shell metacharacters or unsanitized user-provided task descriptions, it could lead to arbitrary command execution within the agent's environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates a self-learning loop that fetches data from an external 'ReasoningBank' using the claude-flow utility.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the context via the searchPatterns method and the npx command outputs in SKILL.md hooks.
  • Boundary markers: No clear boundary markers or instructions to ignore instructions embedded in retrieved patterns are present.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege tools including Bash, Write, and Edit, allowing it to modify the codebase or execute system commands.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the 'successful' patterns retrieved from the external database before they are presented to the agent's reasoning process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 04:32 PM