agent-dev-backend-api
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's hooks (
pre_execution,post_execution, andon_error) frequently executenpx claude-flow@alpha. This command downloads and runs a package from the NPM registry at runtime. This dependency is an 'alpha' version and does not originate from a well-known or trusted organization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The shell scripts defined in the lifecycle hooks interpolate variables such as
$TASK,$TASK_CONTEXT, and$TASK_OUTPUTdirectly into commands (e.g.,npx claude-flow@alpha memory search-patterns "API implementation: $TASK"). If these variables contain shell metacharacters or unsanitized user-provided task descriptions, it could lead to arbitrary command execution within the agent's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates a self-learning loop that fetches data from an external 'ReasoningBank' using the
claude-flowutility. - Ingestion points: Data enters the context via the
searchPatternsmethod and thenpxcommand outputs inSKILL.mdhooks. - Boundary markers: No clear boundary markers or instructions to ignore instructions embedded in retrieved patterns are present.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege tools including
Bash,Write, andEdit, allowing it to modify the codebase or execute system commands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the 'successful' patterns retrieved from the external database before they are presented to the agent's reasoning process.
Audit Metadata