agent-swarm-issue
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute scripts that interpolate variables derived directly from untrusted GitHub issue content (titles, bodies, and subtask descriptions) into command lines. This creates a high risk of command injection if a GitHub issue title or body contains shell metacharacters such as backticks or dollar-parens. Evidence: In SKILL.md, the script constructs commands like
gh issue create --title "$TITLE" --body "$BODY"where variables are assigned from raw issue data without sanitization. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches and executes the
ruv-swarmpackage from the NPM registry at runtime usingnpx. Evidence: Multiple features, including 'Issue-to-Swarm Conversion' and 'Task Decomposition', depend on executingnpx ruv-swarmto perform core orchestration logic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements logic to parse and execute commands embedded in GitHub issue comments (e.g.,
$swarm analyze), which serves as a direct surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker can influence agent actions by commenting on issues. 1. Ingestion points: The skill reads GitHub issue bodies and comments viagh issue viewandgh issue list. 2. Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used to separate issue content from system instructions. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has access toBash,Write, GitHub management tools, and agent spawning capabilities viamcp__claude-flow__agent_spawn. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of GitHub content is performed before processing or command interpolation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata