agent-swarm-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to ingest and act upon untrusted data from GitHub Pull Requests.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from PR descriptions, labels, and metadata via
gh pr viewcommands, and from PR comments via GitHub Action event triggers (github.event.comment.body). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or directives (such as 'ignore embedded instructions') are implemented to separate untrusted PR content from the agent's command logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to sensitive tools including
Bashfor command execution,WriteandEditfor filesystem modification, and GitHub management tools such asmcp__github__merge_pull_request. - Sanitization: The implementation patterns show PR content being interpolated directly into shell arguments and passed to external utilities without visible sanitization or input validation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute GitHub CLI (gh) and the vendor's ownruv-swarmcommands, incorporating data from external PR sources into these execution strings. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npx ruv-swarmto download and execute the vendor's swarm management package at runtime, which is standard behavior for accessing the 'ruvnet' ecosystem resources.
Audit Metadata