skills/ruvnet/ruflo/Hooks Automation/Gen Agent Trust Hub

Hooks Automation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's configuration pattern interpolates agent tool parameters directly into shell strings (e.g., npx claude-flow hook pre-edit --file '${tool.params.file_path}'). This creates a significant command injection surface if a file name or task description contains shell metacharacters like semicolons or backticks.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the modification of Git hooks (such as pre-commit and pre-push), which allows for the persistence and automatic execution of scripts during routine version control operations.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation instructs users to install an external NPM package (claude-flow@alpha) as a prerequisite for its core functionality.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The framework allows for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript files (e.g., .claude$hooks$custom-quality-check.js) as "Custom Hooks," which enables the execution of unverified local code based on configuration settings.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Documentation examples explicitly mention operating on sensitive files such as production.env, which could lead to accidental exposure if combined with the skill's "broadcast" notification features.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a clear attack surface for indirect injection:
  • Ingestion points: Tool parameters like file_path, command, task, and pattern are used as inputs in SKILL.md configuration examples.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; parameters are interpolated directly into shell command strings.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, modify Git hooks, and call MCP tools for memory and agent management.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping or validation of these parameters before execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 9, 2026, 06:47 AM