synapse-manager
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions to bypass security controls in sub-agents.
- In
references/auto-approve-flags.md, it directs the use of flags such as--dangerously-skip-permissionsfor Claude Code and--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxfor Codex CLI. - These instructions effectively strip away the AI's internal safety guardrails and human-approval requirements.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a complex multi-agent orchestration framework relying on local command execution.
- It utilizes shell scripts like
scripts/wait_ready.shandscripts/regression_triage.shto manage environment state and agent lifecycles. - The
synapseCLI is used extensively to spawn, interrupt, and kill processes, providing a high degree of control over the local system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes documentation for bypassing standard UI interactions via API calls.
references/auto-approve-flags.mdcontains acurlexample targetinghttp://localhost:8100/spawnto programmatically create agents with safety-bypass flags enabled.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The multi-agent architecture creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the management context through
synapse sendmessages,synapse memory searchresults, and file attachments via the--attachflag. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when one agent processes output from another.
- Capability inventory: The manager agent possesses high-privilege capabilities including agent spawning/termination and arbitrary script execution.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of data passed between agents, allowing a malicious payload in a sub-task to potentially influence the manager agent's next commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata