orderflow-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill processes external Level 2 market data which could theoretically be manipulated to influence agent logic.
- Ingestion points:
get_orderbook_stateandconnect_l2_streamcalls inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the procedural steps do not include instructions for the agent to ignore potential embedded instructions within the market data stream.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes the capability to trigger trade execution via the
execute_confirmed_tradefunction. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill assumes data from providers like Alpaca or Polygon is pure market telemetry without performing validation for non-numeric content.
- [Prompt Injection] (SAFE): No direct override markers, role-play/DAN injections, or attempts to extract system prompts were detected.
- [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (SAFE): No hardcoded credentials, sensitive file paths (e.g., .env, .ssh), or unauthorized network exfiltration patterns are present.
- [Unverifiable Dependencies] (SAFE): The skill utilizes an MCP server (
trading-orderflow) and established trading APIs. No unverified third-party package installations or piped remote executions (e.g., curl|bash) were found. - [Privilege Escalation] (SAFE): No commands for escalating system privileges (sudo, chmod) or modifying system configurations were detected.
Audit Metadata