docx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The file ooxml/scripts/pack.py uses subprocess.run to execute the soffice (LibreOffice) command. While the arguments are structured, processing untrusted Office files through a complex external suite like LibreOffice increases the attack surface for document-based exploits.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE] (HIGH): In ooxml/scripts/unpack.py, the script uses zipfile.ZipFile(input_file).extractall(output_path) without validating the member names within the ZIP archive. This exposes the system to a 'Zip Slip' attack, where a maliciously crafted document could contain relative paths (e.g., ../../etc/passwd) to overwrite arbitrary files on the host system.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is specifically designed to ingest and process untrusted external data in the form of Office documents.
  • Ingestion points: ooxml/scripts/unpack.py and ooxml/scripts/validate.py ingest .docx, .pptx, and .xlsx files.
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill parses raw XML content from the archives.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-system write capabilities (via extractall) and external command execution capabilities (via soffice).
  • Sanitization: Although the skill uses defusedxml to prevent XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, it lacks sanitization for the ZIP file structure itself.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 06:15 AM