salvo-proxy
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (MEDIUM): The skill implements a reverse proxy that handles untrusted external HTTP requests and forwards them to backends, creating a vulnerability surface where external data can influence internal network operations.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
Router::with_path("{**rest}")(SKILL.md) to capture all incoming request paths and data.\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent or the application to distinguish between untrusted user data and proxy control logic.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
salvo::proxy::Proxyfor network forwarding andreqwestfor automated health checks against backend servers (SKILL.md).\n - Sanitization: The provided examples forward request headers and paths directly to backend services without validation, sanitization, or filtering.\n- [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (SAFE): The skill does not contain hardcoded credentials, API keys, or patterns for accessing sensitive local system files like
~/.sshor.env. Network activity is limited to the proxy's stated purpose of forwarding requests.\n- [Remote Code Execution] (SAFE): There are no patterns involving the download and execution of remote scripts, nor any use of dynamic code execution functions likeevalorexec.\n- [Privilege Escalation] (SAFE): The code does not usesudo, modify system-wide configurations, or attempt to escalate process privileges.\n- [Best Practice Note] (LOW): The examples useTcpListener::new("0.0.0.0:8080")which binds to all network interfaces, andCors::permissive(), which allows any origin to access the proxy. These settings are common in development examples but should be restricted in production environments to prevent unauthorized access.
Audit Metadata