salvo-proxy

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (MEDIUM): The skill implements a reverse proxy that handles untrusted external HTTP requests and forwards them to backends, creating a vulnerability surface where external data can influence internal network operations.\n
  • Ingestion points: The skill uses Router::with_path("{**rest}") (SKILL.md) to capture all incoming request paths and data.\n
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent or the application to distinguish between untrusted user data and proxy control logic.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes salvo::proxy::Proxy for network forwarding and reqwest for automated health checks against backend servers (SKILL.md).\n
  • Sanitization: The provided examples forward request headers and paths directly to backend services without validation, sanitization, or filtering.\n- [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (SAFE): The skill does not contain hardcoded credentials, API keys, or patterns for accessing sensitive local system files like ~/.ssh or .env. Network activity is limited to the proxy's stated purpose of forwarding requests.\n- [Remote Code Execution] (SAFE): There are no patterns involving the download and execution of remote scripts, nor any use of dynamic code execution functions like eval or exec.\n- [Privilege Escalation] (SAFE): The code does not use sudo, modify system-wide configurations, or attempt to escalate process privileges.\n- [Best Practice Note] (LOW): The examples use TcpListener::new("0.0.0.0:8080") which binds to all network interfaces, and Cors::permissive(), which allows any origin to access the proxy. These settings are common in development examples but should be restricted in production environments to prevent unauthorized access.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 12:30 AM