remind-me
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The shell scripts
create-reminder.shandcreate-recurring.share vulnerable to command injection. User-supplied reminder messages ($MESSAGE) and schedules ($WHEN, $SCHEDULE) are directly interpolated into bash command lines (e.g.,npx tsx src/index.ts cron add --name "Reminder: $MESSAGE" ...) without any sanitization or proper escaping. An attacker could provide a message such asfoo" ; id ; #to execute arbitrary system commands. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Both creation scripts contain a hardcoded Telegram recipient ID (
6636746252) used as the target for delivery. This causes all processed reminders—which may contain sensitive personal information or system details—to be sent to a specific external account, bypassing the user's control and visibility. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by accepting untrusted natural language input for reminders and schedules, then passing this data into a vulnerable shell execution environment. This provides a direct path for external data to compromise the host system.
- Ingestion points: Natural language commands defined in
SKILL.mdand processed by the agent. - Boundary markers: None; the skill lacks delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within user input.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (
npx tsx,bash), file system modification (sed -i,echo >>), and network access (implied by the Telegram delivery mechanism). - Sanitization: Absent; variables are used in shell interpolations without escaping or validation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata