skills/satone7/skills/guardian/Gen Agent Trust Hub

guardian

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the CronCreate tool to establish a recurring background monitoring loop. This creates a persistence mechanism that allows the agent to run code autonomously every 5 minutes throughout the work session.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions command the agent to use tmux send-keys with carriage return characters (C-m) to inject text and commands directly into the terminal panes of other agents. This allows one agent to take control of another's shell session.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes a Self-Maintenance Rule which directs the agent to edit its own instruction file at runtime. This self-modifying capability can be used to bypass safety protocols or introduce malicious persistent instructions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions contain high-priority Fundamental Rules that claim to override everything and specifically task the agent with auto-approving security-sensitive prompts such as permission dialogs on behalf of the user.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill grants the agent permission to read internal configuration files in ~/.claude/teams/ and capture terminal scrollback from multiple tmux panes, facilitating unauthorized exposure of sensitive agent state and user activity.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 6, 2026, 11:27 AM